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Abstract 
Since interviewees typically say less when an interpreter is present, we examined 
whether this was caused by interpreters not interpreting everything interviewees says or by 
interviewees providing less information. We further examined (1) the effect of a model 
drawing on providing information and (2) the diagnostic value of total details and the 
proportion of complications as cues to deceit.  
Hispanic, Russian, and South Korean participants were interviewed by native 
interviewers or by a British interviewer through an interpreter. Truth tellers discussed a trip 
they had made; liars fabricated a story. Participants received no instruction (condition 1) or 
were instructed to sketch while narrating without (condition 2) or with (condition 3) being 
given examples of detailed sketches.  
Interviewees said less when an interpreter was present because they provided less 
information. Truth tellers gave more details and, particularly, obtained a higher proportion of 
complications than liars. The Sketching manipulation had no effect. 
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Eliciting Information and Cues to Deceit through Sketching in  
Interpreter-Based Interviews  
 Interpreters are often introduced to resolve language barriers when interviewers and 
interviewees do not speak each other’s language (Russano, Narchet, & Kleinman, 2014: 
Russano, Narchet, Kleinman, & Meissner, 2014). Although interpreters have been used 
frequently and for many years, experimental research examining the effect of an interpreter 
on rapport, the elicitation of information and cues to deceit only started to emerge recently 
(Ewens 2016a, b, 2017; Houston, Russano, & Ricks, 2017; Vrij, Leal et al., 2017; Vrij et al., 
2018a, c). In the current experiment, we also focused on the elicitation of information and 
cues to deceit, particularly (1) on reasons why interviewees may say less in interpreter-
present interviews than in interpreter-absent interviews, (2) how the introduction of a model 
drawing may encourage interviewees to say more and (3) how the presence of an interpreter 
and model drawing may affect truth tellers and liars differently.  
The effect of an interpreter on the information provided 
In a previous interpreter experiment, interviewees from Russian, Korean and Hispanic 
origin were interviewed in their own language by either a native interviewer or by an English 
interviewer through an interpreter (Vrij, Leal et al., 2017). The interviewees provided fewer 
details (defined as units of information) in the interpreter-present interviews than in the 
interpreter-absent interviews. Ewens et al. (2017) offered three explanations for this finding. 
First, perhaps information got lost in translation and the interpreter did not translate every 
detail the interviewee reported. Second, perhaps the frequent interruptions by the interpreter 
when translating the interviewee’s recall distracted the interviewee, which subsequently 
impaired his/her memory (Nelson & Goodmon, 2003). Third, the interviewee may have 
decided to be more concise when the interpreter was present, considering the time it takes for 
the interpreter to translate every detail.  
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Vrij, Leal et al.’s (2017) study did not allow to empirically test Ewens et al.’s (2017) 
explanations, but in the present experiment we attempted such an empirical test. In the 
interpreter-present interviews, we did not only code the details in the interpreter’s translation 
-as Vrij, Leal et al. (2017) did- but we also coded the details the interviewees actually 
reported. When comparing the interpreter’s translation with the interviewee’s recall we could 
thus examine how much information was lost in translation. We also examined the extent to 
which interviewees chose not to be detailed. We invited them in the interview to discuss as 
many ‘key moments’ as they would like, events of particular interest to them. To help them 
with this, we invited them first to write down as many key words as they would like, words 
that captured the event well. We counted the number of key words they wrote down and the 
number of key moments (key events) they reported. If interviewees chose to be concise in 
interpreter-present interviews, they would write down fewer key words and would describe 
fewer key events.  
The effect of veracity on the information provided 
 Truth tellers typically report more details than liars (Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 
2016; DePaulo et al., 2003; Oberlader et al., 2016). Liars may be unable to report many 
details, given that these details should sound plausible (Köhnken, 2004), or may be unwilling 
to report many details, because they fear that such details may give leads to investigators that 
they are lying (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014). Researchers recently pointed out a limitation 
associated with relying on number of details when attempting to detect deceit (Vrij, Leal et 
al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2018a, b, c). Number of details is a general measure that does not take 
well enough into account the different strategies truth tellers and liars employ. Perhaps a 
measure that captures those strategies better will yield better results in terms of truth/lie 
detection.  
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 In search of measures that take the strategies truth tellers and liars use better into 
account, researchers recently started to examine specific types of detail: Complications, 
common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies (Vrij, Leal et al., 2017; Vrij et 
al., 2018a, b, c). A complication is an occurrence that makes a situation more difficult to 
report than necessary (e.g., “On my way back I got lost and could not find the entry to the 
tube station”). Truth tellers are thought to report more complications than liars, due to liar’s 
tendency to keep their stories simple (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007). Common 
knowledge details refer to strongly invoked stereotypical information about events (e.g., “We 
went to the top of the Eiffel Tower from where we had a wonderful view of Paris”). Liars are 
thought to report more common knowledge details than truth tellers, because liars lack 
personal experiences to add to their descriptions of events. Truth tellers have personal 
experiences of an event and are likely to report them when describing these events (DePaulo, 
Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). Adding personal experiences when describing an 
event makes those descriptions less scripted. Self-handicapping strategies refer to justifications 
as to why someone is not able to provide information (“I can't tell you about the beginning of 
the BBQ, because I arrived late”). Liars are thought to report more self-handicapping 
strategies than truth tellers. Liars are inclined to keep stories simple, but are also concerned 
that just admitting lack of knowledge and/or memory appears suspicious (Ruby & Brigham, 
1998). A potential solution is to provide a justification for the inability to provide 
information.  
If truth tellers are more likely to report one type of detail (complications) and liars 
other types of detail (common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies), analysing 
the data separately for the three types of detail should be more informative about deception 
than analyzing the total number of details, which includes three types of detail. In particular, 
a proportion score, such as the proportion of cues to truthfulness –complications / 
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(complications + common knowledge details + self-handicapping strategies)- should be more 
diagnostic than the total details variable. This was indeed found in the previous experiments 
(Vrij, Leal et al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2018a, b, c). 
The effect of a model statement drawing on the information provided 
Many practitioners told us that they use drawings as an information-gathering tool in 
interviews with suspects or sources. They also mentioned that they would be keen to learn 
whether drawings can be used as a lie detection tool. There are reasons to believe and 
evidence available that this might be the case, which is why we examined the use of drawings 
in this experiment. Since practitioners use tools in different settings, including in interviews 
with or without an interpreter present, it is important to examine the utility of a tool in such 
different settings, which we did in the present experiment.  
Sketching while narrating facilitates recall in truth tellers (Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 
2009; Leins, Fisher, Pludwinsky, Robertson, & Mueller, 2014; Mattison, Dando, & Omerod, 
2015). Vrij et al. (2018a) provided four reasons why sketching facilitated recall in truth 
tellers. First, sketching mentally reinstates the context of the interviewee’s experience and 
context reinstatement enhances recall. Second, sketching is a visual output and therefore 
more compatible with visually experienced events than just a verbal account. A more 
compatible output enhances recall. Third, sketching is a time-consuming activity which gives 
truth tellers good opportunity to search their memory.  More time to retrieve an event could 
facilitate recall. Fourth, sketching automatically leads to the provision of spatial information 
as someone must situate each person or object somewhere in the location s/he sketches. In a 
verbal response someone not always spontaneously report where persons and objects were 
exactly located.  
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 As mentioned above, liars are typically unable or unwilling to report many details. 
Therefore methods that facilitate recall (such as sketching) should have a stronger effect on 
truth tellers than on liars, enhancing the difference in reporting details between them. This 
was indeed found in Vrij et al. (2018a). In their experiment, truth tellers and liars reported 
alleged activities. In the sketch condition, participants sketched while discussing these 
activities, whereas in the control condition, participants discussed these activities without 
sketching. Truth tellers provided more details and more complications than liars, but only in 
the sketch condition. 
In the present experiment we sought to replicate Vrij et al.’s (2018a) findings but 
added a second drawing condition to the design: the model-drawing. In this condition 
participants were shown three examples of detailed drawings when asked to sketch while 
talking. Perhaps the amount of detail in these drawings would stimulate truth tellers to think 
about their experienced event in a similarly detailed manner which could subsequently 
enhance the number of details they would report. This would further enhance the differences 
between truth tellers and liars.  
The principle behind the model drawing is thus somewhat similar to the principle 
behind the auditory model statement, which is an audiotaped example of a detail answer 
about a topic unrelated to the topic of investigation (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & 
Fisher, 2015). A model statement raises interviewees’ expectations about how many details 
are desired (Ewens et al., 2016b) and research has shown that interviewees reported more 
details in model statement present interviews than in model statement absent interviews. (See 
Vrij, Leal, and Fisher [2018] for a review of these studies.) Exposure to a model statement 
resulted in truth tellers and liars reporting a similar amount of additional detail (Vrij, Leal, & 
Fisher, 2018). Since a model statement makes it obvious to both truth tellers and liars that 
more detail is required (Ewens et al., 2016b), they apparently responded to a model statement 
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in the same way. Most auditory model statement studies just examined the total number of 
details that was reported, but when a distinction was made in the type of detail they provided, 
a difference emerged: Truth tellers reported more complications than liars (Vrij, Leal et al., 
2017). Truth tellers often do not report complications they have experienced because they are 
typically not crucial to understand the main message they wish to convey. Perhaps, only 
when they realise that they have to report many details, do they decide to report 
complications.  
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were tested: 
- Interviewees will describe fewer key moments (events of particular interest to them) and 
will write down fewer key words (words that capture these event well) in interpreter-present 
interviews than in interpreter-absent interviews (Hypothesis 1).  
- Interviewees will report fewer details (defined as units of informartion) in interpreter-
present interviews than in interpreter-absent interviews (Hypothesis 2) 
- Truth tellers will report more details and more complications than liars (Hypothesis 3a), 
whereas liars will report more common knowledge details and more self-handicapping 
strategies than truth tellers (Hypothesis 3b) 
- The proportion of complications will be higher in truth tellers than in liars (Hypothesis 4a) 
and will be a more diagnostic indicator of deceit than total details (Hypothesis 4b) 
- A model drawing will result in more details and more complications than a standard 
drawing, which, in turn, will result in more details and more complications than a no drawing 
control condition (Hypothesis 5) 
- The effect presented in Hypothesis 5 will occur particularly in truth tellers (Hypothesis 6). 
 We explored the effect of an interpreter on complications, common knowledge and 
self-handicapping strategies, because previous findings were inconsistent and difficult to 
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explain. For example, if interviewees are more inclined to be concise in the presence of an 
interpreter, this could result in reporting fewer complications and more common knowledge 
details. However, this has not been found to date. Vrij, Leal et al. (2017) found no effect of 
an interpreter on complications, common knowledge and self-handicapping strategies, 
whereas Vrij et al. (2018c) found that interpreter-present interviews resulted in fewer 
common knowledge details than interpreter-absent interviews. They speculated that the 
presence of an interpreter gave interviewees more thinking time, which they used to make 
their stories sound less scripted.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 205 University students (39 males and 166 females) took part in the study. 
Their age ranged from 18-42 years with an average age of M = 21.93 years (SD = 3.87). The 
experiment took place in three different universities in South Korea, Russia and USA, and the 
participants were of Korean (n = 80), Russian (n = 80) and Hispanic (n = 45) origin.  
Procedure 
 Recruitment, pre-condition selection form, preparation and pre-interview 
questionnaire.  
 We used the same procedure as Vrij, Leal et al. (2017) and Vrij et al. (2018a, c). 
Participants were recruited via an advert on the university intranets and advertisement leaflets 
distributed in university buildings. The advert explained that the experiment would require 
participants to tell the truth or lie about a trip away that they may (or may not) have taken 
within the last year. We decided upon “within the last year” so that truth tellers would still 
remember many details about their trip and liars could not easily feign memory loss when 
answering the questions. Participants first received a participant information sheet and signed 
an informed consent form. They then completed a selection form that contained six cities that 
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the researchers thought the participants may have visited during the past year. (Different 
cities were used for the three different countries.) The six cities were included on the 
selection form so that we would obtain some kind of standardization of the cities discussed in 
the study. The participants were also asked to write down the names of two other cities they 
had visited during the past year. We did so because if truth tellers had not been to any of the 
six cities mentioned on the selection form in the past twelve months, they could discuss in the 
interview one of these two additional cities.  
For each city the participants indicated (a) whether they had been there during the last 
twelve months, (b) when they had been there during the last twelve months, (c) for how long 
they stayed there, and (d) whether they have lived there. For truth tellers, the experimenter 
selected one of the six cities where the participant had stayed during the last twelve months 
for at least two nights but had never lived there. In case a truth teller had stayed in only one 
of those six cities, that particularly city was chosen. In case a truth teller had stayed in more 
than one of these six cities the experimenter chose a city, ideally one that had not been 
discussed by (too) many truth tellers before so that we would obtain a variety of cities being 
discussed. In case a truth teller had not been to any of the six cities, the experimenter selected 
one of the additional cities that the truth teller had listed on the selection form. Truth tellers 
were informed that they would be interviewed about this selected city (city X) and asked to 
answer the questions truthfully. For liars, the experimenter selected either one of the six cities 
on the selection form where the liar had never been in his/her life before, or selected a city 
not on the list but which was discussed by a truth teller during an interview (after checking 
that the liar had never been to this city before). In other words, the truth tellers’ and liars’ 
cities were matched. Liars were informed that they would be interviewed about city X and 
that they had to pretend to have stayed there for at least two nights during a trip made during 
the last twelve months. Across all 102 truth tellers, more than 60 cities were used. Each truth 
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
teller reported a trip to a single city (rather than to multiple cities). The cities liars discussed 
were taken from this sample of 60 cities.  
Participants were then given a computer with internet access and told they had twenty 
minutes to prepare themselves for their interview, or to inform the experimenter if they were 
ready before that time. The participants were told that they were allowed to make notes while 
doing their research. They were also told that it was important to be convincing because, if 
they did not appear convincing, they would be asked to write a statement about what they 
told the interviewer in the interview. In a pre-interview questionnaire the truth tellers and 
liars rated their thoroughness of preparation via three items: (1) shallow to (7) thorough; (1) 
insufficient to (7) sufficient; and (1) poor to (7) good. The answers to the three questions 
were averaged (Cronbach’s alpha = .84) and the variable is called ‘preparation thoroughness’. 
They were also asked whether they thought they were given enough time to prepare 
themselves with the following question: ‘Do you think the amount of time you were given to 
prepare was: (1) insufficient to (7) sufficient. Finally, they were asked how motivated they 
were to perform well during the interview: (1) not at all motivated to (5) very motivated.  
Experimental conditions. 
 Participants were allocated randomly to one of the twelve experimental cells. A total 
of 102 participants were allocated to the truth condition and 103 to the lie condition; 69 to the 
Sketching-absent condition, 68 to the Sketching-present condition and 68 to the Model 
Sketching-present condition; 101 to the Interpreter-absent condition and 104 to the 
Interpreter-present condition. Individual cell sizes varied from 16 to 18. These cell sizes are 
rather small, making it difficult to detect the 2 X 2 X 3 interaction; the cell sizes are adequate, 
though, for the various main effects and 2-way interactions (cell sizes for all two-way 
interactions and main effects were > 34).  
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 In total, three interpreters were used in the study, one in each country. The Korean 
and Russian interpreters were the same as used in Vrij, Leal et al. (2017) and Vrij et al. 
(2018a, c). The Korean interpreter was a professional interpreter and the Russian interpreter 
spoke fluent English. The Hispanic interpreter was English – Hispanic bilingual. The 
interpreters were instructed to use a long consecutive interpreter style (Viezzi, 2012). In this 
interpreter style, the interviewee provides chunks of information at a time with the interpreter 
writing down what the interviewee says. During a natural pause in the interviewee’s speech, 
the interpreter interprets the chunk of information consulting his/her notes.  
 In the interpreter condition, one British interviewer was used, and in the non-
interpreter condition one Russian, one Korean and one Hispanic interviewer were used. The 
British and Russian interviewers were the same as in Vrij, Leal et al. (2017) and Vrij et al. 
(2018a, c), whereas the Korean and Hispanic interviewers were new. Prior to the experiment 
the British interviewer -a very experienced interviewer and has interviewed in many 
experiments before- instructed the other interviewers how to conduct the interview. They 
were instructed to be friendly and not to interrupt the interviewee. Practice sessions took 
place until the British interviewer was satisfied with the interview style of each interviewer. 
That is, she was satisfied with the demeanour of the interviewers (appeared friendly) and the 
opportunities they gave to the interviewees to talk (no interruptions). To assess consistency in 
interview style between the interpreter and non-interpreter conditions, participants were 
asked to assess in a post-questionnaire the rapport they experienced with the interviewer (see 
below). All interpreters and interviewers were blind to the veracity condition.  
 Nationality is confounded  with the specific interviewer and specific interpreter. To 
control for the possible effects of this confound, we included site as a covariate in the 
hypotheses-testing analyses. 
 
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 The interview. 
Prior to the interview, the experimenter told the interviewer about which city to 
interview the participant. To make the interviewee feel comfortable and to avoid floor effects 
in establishing rapport interviewees were offered a glass of water from the interviewer, as 
offering something helps rapport building (reciprocation principle, Cialdini, 2007).  
The interviewer started by saying “I will interview you about your trip to ________ 
Depending on your answers, we may decide to interview you a second time.” This was 
followed by the following request: “Please tell me in as much detail as possible everything 
you did when you were at _________ from the moment you arrived to the moment you left.” 
We label this initial request and answer, Phase 1.  
After the interviewee’s answer, Phase 2 started with the following request: “I want 
you now to think about key moments or memorable events during your trip. Take a few 
moments to picture in your mind such key moments or memorable events. Now think about 
where you were and what you saw at that time, including who you were with, descriptions of 
objects and locations, and the sequence of actions. Write down some key words that 
summarise your experiences and please let me know when you have done this”. After this 
request, the interviewer asked the interviewee to report one key moment and then introduced 
the sketching manipulation: In the Sketching-absent condition the interviewer said: “Now 
please tell me everything you remember”. In the Standard-Sketching condition the 
interviewer said: “Now please tell me everything you remember but while doing this make a 
sketch of what you could see”. In the Model-Sketching condition the interviewer said: “Now 
please tell me everything you remember but while doing this make a sketch of what you 
could see. Before you start have a look at these three sketches made by someone who 
described her experience at the dentist”. We then showed the participants three detailed 
sketches of a dentist visit: One sketch of the building from the outside; one sketch from the 
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waiting room; and one sketch from the dentist room. We left the sketches next to the 
participants while they talked and sketched. We chose the dentist as a topic because we 
wanted to avoid showing participants pictures of an experience they were about to describe 
themselves. We thought it unlikely for them to describe a visit to the dentist and nobody 
actually did.  
The participants in the Standard-Sketching and Model-Sketching conditions were 
given sheets of A4-sized paper and a set of coloured pencils to make the sketch. They were 
also reassured that the quality of their drawing did not matter. While the interviewees 
sketched and talked the interpreter took notes of what the interviewees said and conveyed this 
information to the interviewer at regular times, during which the interviewees stayed quiet. 
We label the verbal recall of the participants to this request is called Phase 2, event 1.  
After the participants finished their description of the first event, they were invited to 
describe another event if they wished. Those in the sketching conditions were requested to 
sketch and talk again. The interview was finished when (1) interviewees said that they had no 
further event to report, or (2) after they reported four events. We label this Phase 2, events 2-
4.  
A total of 184 participants described more than one event. The 21 participants who 
only described one event included 14 truth tellers and 7 liars; 14 participants from the 
interpreter-present interviews and 7 from the interpreter-absent interviews; and 11 from the 
Model-Sketching condition, 5 from the Standard-Sketching condition and 5 from the 
Sketching-absent condition. In sum, 205 participants produced verbal reports in Phase 1 and 
Phase 2, event 1 and 184 participants produced verbal reports in Phase 2, events 2-4. 
The interviews were video (interviewees only) and audio recorded. The Russian, 
Korean and Hispanic speech was transcribed and then translated into English. For the 
interpreter-present interviews this resulted in two segments of English text: The original 
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speech from the interviewee translated into English and the English speech from the 
interpreter as she interpreted the interviewee’s speech during the interview. In the main 
analyses we used the English speech spoken by the interpreter (interpreter-text). We did this 
because it is this speech that interviewers will understand in real-life interviews with 
interpreters. In the follow-up part of the study (see the Results section) we also used the 
original speech by the interviewee translated into English (interviewee-text) and compared 
the interpreter-text with the interviewee-text. 
Post-interview questionnaire. 
After the interview, participants completed a post-interview questionnaire, which was 
written in the participant’s native language. The participants were asked to indicate the extent 
to which they told the truth during the interview on an 11 point Likert scale ranging from 0% 
to 100%. 
Rapport was measured via the nine-item Interaction Questionnaire (Vallano & 
Schreiber Compo, 2011).  Participants rated the interviewer on 7-point scales ranging from 
[1] not at all to [7] extremely on nine characteristics such as smooth, bored, engrossed, and 
involved (Cronbach’s alpha = .84).  
For those participants who were asked to sketch we asked about their experiences. 
They were asked the following four questions, which they answered on 7-point scales ranging 
from (1) not at all to (7) very much so: (a) ‘Sketching while narrating was easy to do’, (b) 
‘Sketching while narrating was difficult to do’, (c) ‘Sketching while narrating made it easier 
for me to think what I wanted to say’, (d) ‘Sketching while narrating made it more difficult 
for me to think what I wanted to say’. Questions (b) and (d) were recoded and the four 
questions were averaged to form the cluster labeled “easy to sketch and talk” (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .84). 
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Coding 
 Detail.  
 The coders, blind to the Veracity condition, were taught the coding scheme by the 
first author who has more than twenty years of experience in coding detail. A coder first read 
the transcripts and coded each detail in the interview. A detail is defined as a unit of 
information about the trip the interviewee allegedly had made. For example, the following 
answer has seven details: “I'm also drawing a plaza that is in front of the cathedral. There was 
a large fountain. It had a lot of seats, or benches”. Each detail in the interview was coded only 
once; thus repetitions were not coded. A second coder coded a random sample of 40 
transcripts. Inter-rater reliability between the two coders, using the two-way random effects 
model measuring consistency, was good (Single Measures ICC = .74).  
Two coders coded independently from each other the following measures in all 
transcripts: Complications, common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies. 
Repetitions were not coded. A complication is an occurrence that makes a situation more 
difficult to report than necessary (Vrij et al., 2018b). Example of complications are (a) “We 
wanted to go to the theatre, but it was closed”; (b) “I fell and my bike got stuck in a tree”; and 
(c) “The hotel beach was full of little stones”. Common knowledge details refer to strongly 
invoked stereotypical knowledge about events (Vrij et al., 2018b). Examples of common 
knowledge details are: (d) “We also managed to visit the Olympic Park”, (e) “We also visited 
a car museum with different Soviet cars” and (f) “We walked in the city and looked at the old 
buildings”. Self-handicapping strategies refer to explicit or implicit justifications as to why 
someone is not able to provide information (Vrij et al., 2018b). Examples of self-
handicapping strategies are: (g) “We decided not to go inside because we already saw such a 
fortress before”, (h) “I can’t remember the name of the hotel, I don’t speak Swedish” and (i) 
“I’m not very good at remembering names, so I will just tell you common details”.  
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 Inter-rater reliability between the two coders, using the two-way random effects 
model measuring consistency, was good for complications (Average Measures, Intraclass 
correlation coefficient, ICC = .92) and common knowledge details (Average Measures ICC = 
.78) and satisfactory for self-handicapping strategies (Average Measures ICC = .68). 
Disagreements were resolved between the two coders.  
 The key words the participants had written down when thinking about memorable 
events were translated into English and the number of key words written down were entered 
into the SPSS file. The details coder also counted how many events were described.  
Results 
 All statistical information for the Veracity main effect appear in Table 1 and for the 
Interpreter main effect in Table 2. For the dependent variables presented in the Hypotheses-
testing part of this Results section, we report the statistical information regardless of whether 
the Veracity or Interpreter main effect was significant. For the remaining dependent 
variables, presented before the Hypotheses-testing part, we only report the significant results. 
We do not report the Sketch main effect results in a table due to a lack of significant results 
(only one significant Sketch univariate main effect emerged, for proportion of complications 
in Phase 2, Event 1, F(2, 187) = 3.51, p = .032, ηp2 = .036, all other F’s < 2.35, all p’s > 
.099). 
Preparation thoroughness, preparation time and motivation  
 Three 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Sketch) X 2 (Interpreter) ANOVAs were carried out with 
preparation thoroughness, preparation time and motivation as dependent variables. For 
preparation thoroughness, a significant main effect for Veracity emerged: Truth tellers rated 
their preparation as more thorough than liars (Table 1). All other effects were not significant, 
all F’s < 2.25, all p’s > .134. For interview time, also as significant main effect emerged: 
Truth tellers believed more than liars that they were given sufficient time to prepare 
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themselves for the interview (Table 1). All other effects were not significant, all F’s < 1.85, 
all p’s > .176.  For motivation, although random allocation to the Interpreter condition took 
place after the participants completed the pre-interview questionnaire, a significant main 
effect for Interpreter emerged. Participants were more motivated in the interpreter-present 
than in the interpreter-absent interviews (Table 2). All other effects were not significant, all 
F’s < 1.01, all p’s > .367. Since preparation thoroughness, preparation time and motivation 
may affect participants’ verbal output, we introduced these variables as covariates in the 
analyses where we examined verbal output.  
 Note that preparation thoroughness and preparation time were measured on 7-point 
Likert scales but motivation on a 5-point Likert scale. The means for preparation 
thoroughness were M = 4.67 (SD = 1.18) for truth tellers and M = 4.30 (SD = 1.17) for liars, 
suggesting that both truth tellers and liars found their preparation thoroughness moderate. 
The mean scores for preparation time were M = 6.07 (SD = 1.13) for truth tellers and M = 
5.35 (SD = 1.72) for liars, indicating that both truth tellers and liars thought they were given 
sufficient time to prepare themselves. The grand mean for motivation was M = 4.00 (SD = 
0.71) which means that participants were very motivated.  
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
Easy to sketch while talking 
 A 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Sketch) X 2 (Interpreter) ANOVA with easy to sketch while 
talking as dependent variable revealed a Veracity X Interpreter interaction effect, F(1, 128) = 
3.99, p = .048, ηp2 = 0.03. All other effects were not significant, all F’s < 2.28, all p’s > .133. 
Simple effect tests showed that the interpreter had no effect on truth tellers, F(1, 66) = 0.23, p 
= .631, d = .12 (-.36,.59), but for liars, sketching while narrating was more difficult with (M = 
2.75, SD = 1.52, 95% CI [2.26, 3.24]) than without (M = 3.66, SD = 1.31, 95% CI [3.17, 
4.14]) an interpreter present, F(1, 66) = 6.93, p = .011, d = .64 (.14, 1.12).  
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Rapport and percentage of truth telling 
 Two ANOVAs utilizing a 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Sketch) X 2 (Interpreter) between-
subjects design were carried out with (1) rapport, and (2) percentage of truth telling as 
dependent variables. The analysis with Rapport resulted in one significant effect, an 
Interpreter main effect: Rapport was better with the interpreter present than with the 
interpreter absent (Table 2). All other effects were not significant, all F’s < 2.67, all p’s > 
.071. We included Rapport as a covariate in the analyses when we examined verbal output.  
 For percentage of truth telling, a main effect for Veracity occurred: Truth tellers 
reported to have been more truthful than liars. The Veracity X Interpreter interaction effect 
was also significant, F(1, 202) = 4.32, p = .039, ηp2 = .02. Simple effect tests showed no 
significant difference between the interpreter-absent and interpreter-present conditions for 
truth tellers, F(1, 100) = 1.14, p < .288, d = .21 (-.18,.60) or for liars, F(1, 101) = 3.24, p = 
.075, d = .35 (-.04,.74). All other effects were not significant, all F’s < 1.36, all p’s > .246.,  
Time since the trip was made 
Truth tellers were asked on the pre-condition selection form to indicate when they 
made the trip they discussed. On average this trip was made M = 5. 41 months prior to the 
interview (SD  = 2.81). This variable was not correlated with any of the main dependent 
variables in the study (detail, complications, common knowledge details, self-handicapping 
strategies or ratio of complications), all r’s < .17, all p’s > .103). 
Hypothesis Testing   
 Number of key events written down. 
 An ANCOVA utilizing a 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interpreter) between-subjects design was 
carried out with the number of key words written down as the dependent variable. 
Preparation thoroughness, preparation time, motivation, rapport and site were the covariates. 
Since the Sketch manipulation was introduced after the participants had written down their 
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key moments, the Sketch factor was not included in this analysis. The analysis resulted in an 
Interpreter main effect: Participants wrote down more key moments when the interpreter was 
present than when the interpreter was absent (Table 2), rejecting Hypothesis 1. The remaining 
effects were not significant, both F’s < 0.25, both p’s > .619.  
Number of events reported.  
 An ANCOVA utilizing a 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Sketch) X 2 (Interpreter) between-subjects 
design was carried out with the number of events written down as the dependent variable. 
Preparation thoroughness, preparation time, motivation, rapport and site were the covariates. 
The analysis revealed one effect, a main Interpreter effect: Participants described more events 
without an interpreter than with an interpreter (Table 2), supporting Hypothesis 1. All other 
effects were not significant, all F’s < 2.80, all p’s > 063. 
 Phase 1 (N = 205): Initial narrative. 
 A MANCOVA utilizing a 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interpreter) between-subjects design was 
carried out with total details, complications, common knowledge details, and self-
handicapping strategies as well as proportion of complications reported in Phase 1 as the 
dependent variables. Preparation thoroughness, preparation time, motivation, rapport and site 
were covariates. Since the Sketch manipulation was introduced after Phase 1, the Sketch 
factor was not included in this analysis.   
 At a multivariate level, the analysis revealed main effects for Veracity F(5, 192) = 
6.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .15 and Interpreter F(5, 192) = 2.30, p = .047, ηp2 = .06, whereas the 
Veracity x Interpreter interaction effect F(5, 192) = 1.79, p = .117, ηp2 = .04, was not 
significant. The univariate main effects for Veracity are presented in Table 1. Truth tellers 
provided more details and complications than liars, and fewer common knowledge details 
and self-handicapping strategies than liars. This supports Hypotheses 3a and 3b for Phase 
1.The proportion of complications was higher in truth teller than in liars. Although Veracity 
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was a significant predictor for all of the dependent measures, the effect size for total details 
was the smallest (d = .23) and considerably smaller than those for complications (d = .68) and 
proportion of complications (d = .68). This supports Hypotheses 4a and 4b for Phase 1. 
 The Interpreter univariate main effects are presented in Table 2. In interpreter-present 
interviews fewer details and complications were reported than in interpreter-absent 
interviews. This supports Hypothesis 2 for Phase 1.  
 Phase 2, Event 1 (N = 205): Key moment 1 description.  
 A MANCOVA utilizing a 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Sketch) X 2 (Interpreter) between-
subjects design was carried out with total details, complications, common knowledge details, 
and self-handicapping strategies as well as proportion of complications reported in Phase 2, 
Event 1 as the dependent variables. Note that we only coded the new details, new 
complications etc., which were not reported by the participants in Phase 1. Since the 
occurrence of those could depend on what was reported in Phase 1, we also included total 
details at Phase 1 as a covariate. As a result, preparation thoroughness, preparation time, 
motivation, rapport, site and total details reported at Phase 1 were the covariates. At a 
multivariate level, the analysis revealed a significant Veracity main effect, F(5, 183) = 5.43, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .12, and a significant Veracity x Sketch x Interpreter interaction effect, F(5, 183) 
= 2.34, p = .011, ηp2 = .06. However, at a univariate level none of the 3-way interaction 
effects were significant, all F’s < 2.62, all p’s > .075.  
The univariate main effects for Veracity are presented in Table 1. The findings are 
similar to those found for Phase 1, with the exception that the effect for self-handicapping 
strategies was no longer significant. Apart from this, again, truth tellers provided more details 
and complications than liars (supporting Hypothesis 3a), and fewer common knowledge 
details than liars (partially supporting Hypothesis 3b). The proportion of complications was 
also higher in truth teller than in liars (supporting Hypothesis 4a) and the effect size was 
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again smaller for total details (d = .38) than for proportion of complications (d = .62), 
supporting Hypothesis 4b. 
All other multivariate effects were not significant, all F’s < 1.95, all p’s > .088. 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 are therefore rejected. Despite the absence of a multivariate main 
Interpreter main effect, F(5, 183) = 1.94, p < .089, ηp2 = .05, Table 2 shows that in 
interpreter-present interviews fewer complications were reported than in interpreter-absent 
interviews. Since total details was not significant, Hypothesis 2 is rejected for Phase 2, Event 
1.  
 Phase 2, Events 2-4 (N = 184): Key moments 2-4 descriptions. 
A MANCOVA utilizing a 2 (Veracity) X 3 (Sketch) X 2 (Interpreter) between-
subjects design was carried out with the new total details, complications, common knowledge 
details, and self-handicapping strategies as well as Proportion of complications reported in 
Phase 2, Events 2-4 as dependent variables. Note that we coded only the new details, new 
complications etc., which have not been reported by the participants in Phase 1. Preparation 
thoroughness, preparation time, motivation, rapport, site and total details at Phase 1 were the 
covariates. Since the events participants reported in Phase 2 differed from each other, there 
was never an overlap in reported details between Phase 2, Event 1 and Phase 2, Events 2-4. 
At a multivariate level, the analysis revealed a significant main effect for Veracity 
F(5, 162) = 8.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .20. The univariate main effects for Veracity are presented in 
Table 1. Truth tellers provided more details and complications than liars, and fewer common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies than liars. The proportion of 
complications was higher in truth teller than in liars. The effect sizes were the smallest for 
self-handicapping strategies (d = .26) and total details (d = .46) and the highest for proportion 
of complications (d = .92). This supports Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b for Phase 2 Events 2-
4. 
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The Veracity X Interpreter interaction effect was also significant, F(5, 162) = 3.10, p 
= .011, ηp2 = .09. However, at a univariate level, none of the Veracity X Interpreter 
interaction effects were significant, all F’s < 2.56, all p’s > .111.  
 All other effects were not significant, all F’s < 1.76, all p’s > .126. Although the 
multivariate Interpreter main effect was not significant, F(5, 162) = 1.75, p = .127, ηp2 = .05, 
the univariate effects again showed that interpreter-present interviews resulted in fewer 
details than interpreter-absent interviews, see Table 2. This supports Hypothesis 2. Since the 
Sketch factor did not yield a significant result, Hypotheses 5 and 6 were again rejected.  
Interpreter-text versus Interviewee-text Comparisons 
 In this section we compare the interpreter’s text and interviewee’s text in three 
different ways. First, we compared these two types of text in a within-subjects comparison. 
We focused hereby on the total unique details, complications, common knowledge details and 
self-handicapping strategies reported during the entire interview. We thus ignored the 
different phases. We also analysed the results for the proportion of complications and for a 
new variable: The total number of words spoken by the interpreter or interviewee. The results 
are presented in Table 3.  
 In the second analysis we compared the interpreter absent and interpreter’s text results 
for the dependent variables listed in the previous paragraph. We also included Veracity as a 
factor but left out the Sketch factor. The dependent variables are not suitable for an analysis 
including the Sketch factor because it includes Phase 1 data in which sketching was not 
manipulated. Since the Sketch factor had no effect on the data, we do not consider leaving out 
this factor problematic. The third analysis was similar to the second analysis, except that we 
now use the interviewee-text data instead of the interpreter-text data. 
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 Analysis 1: Within-subjects comparison 
 A within-subjects analysis with Text (interpreter vs interviewee) as the only factor 
and total unique details, complications, common knowledge details, and self-handicapping 
strategies as well as proportion of complications and word count as the dependent variables 
revealed a significant multivariate effect, F(6, 98) = 8.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .34.  The univariate 
effects are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 about here 
 The interviewee’s text contained more words than the interpreter’s text but not more 
unique details. The interviewee’s text also contained more self-handicapping strategies than 
the interpreter’s text, and the proportion of complications was lower in the interviewee’s text 
than in the interpreter’s text. No other significant effects occurred. Regarding the three 
significant findings, the effect size for word count was moderate (d = .38), but the other two 
effect sizes were small (d = .19 and d = .10 respectively). This suggests not much difference 
between the interpreter and interviewee texts.  
 Analysis 2: Interpreter absent - interpreter’s text comparison 
A MANCOVA was carried out utilizing a 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interpreter: absent vs 
interpreter’s text) between-subjects design with total unique details, complications, common 
knowledge details, and self-handicapping strategies as well as the proportion of 
complications and number of words as the dependent variables. Preparation thoroughness, 
preparation time, motivation, rapport and site were the covariates. At a multivariate level, the 
analysis revealed a significant main effects for Veracity F(6, 191) = 12.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .28 
and Interpreter F(6, 191) = 3.33, p = .004, ηp2 = .10 and a significant Veracity X Interpreter 
interaction effect, F(6, 191) = 2.41, p = .029, ηp2 = .07.  
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The Veracity main effects are presented in the top half of Table 4. Except for number 
of words, all effects were significant. When the interpreter’s text was considered, truth tellers 
reported more unique details and complications and fewer unique common knowledge details 
and self-handicapping strategies than liars. The proportion of complications was also higher 
for truth tellers than liars. The d-scores for complications (d = .80) and proportion of 
complications (d = .87) in particular were high and higher than those for total details (d = 
.45). This again supports Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b. 
The Interpreter main effects are presented in the bottom half of Table 4. When the 
interpreter’s text was considered, the interpreter-absent interviews resulted in more words and 
unique details than the interpreter-present interviews. This supports Hypothesis 2. The 
interpreter-absent interviews also included more unique complications and more self-
handicapping strategies than the interpreter-present interviews. The other effects were not 
significant.  
At a univariate level, only one Veracity x Interpreter interaction effect was significant, 
the effect for unique complications F(1, 196) = 4.12, p = .044, ηp2 = .02. The effect is 
presented in Table 6.  For truth tellers, the interpreter-absent interviews resulted in more 
unique complications than the interpreter-present interviews; by comparison, for liars, no 
difference emerged between the two conditions.  
Analysis 3: Interpreter absent - interviewee’s text comparison 
For the third analysis, a MANCOVA utilizing a 2 (Veracity) X  2 (Interpreter: absent 
vs interviewee’s text) between-subjects design was carried out with total unique details, 
complications, common knowledge details, and self-handicapping strategies as well as the 
proportion of complications and number of words as the dependent variables. Preparation 
thoroughness, preparation time, motivation, rapport and site were the covariates. At a 
multivariate level, the analysis revealed a significant main effects for Veracity F(6, 191) = 
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9.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .24 and Interpreter F(6, 191) = 3.77, p = .001, ηp2 = .11. The Veracity X 
Interpreter interaction effect was marginally significant, F(6, 191) = 2.12, p = .053, ηp2 = .06.  
 
The Veracity main effects are presented in the top half of Table 5. The findings were 
very similar to what we found with the interpreter’s text analysis. When the interviewee’s 
text was considered, again, except for number of words, all effects were significant. Truth 
tellers reported more unique details and complications and fewer unique common knowledge 
details and self-handicapping strategies than liars. The proportion of complications was also 
higher for truth tellers. The d-scores for complications (d = .73) and proportion of 
complications (d = .77) in particular were high. The effect sizes in the analyses with the 
interviewee’s text (Table 5) are very similar to those obtained with the interpreter’s text 
(Table 4).  
The Interpreter main effects are presented in the bottom half of Table 5. When the 
interviewee’s text was considered, the interpreter-absent interviews resulted in more unique 
details and more unique complications than the interpreter-present interviews This supports 
Hypothesis 2. The other effects were not significant. The differences between this analysis 
and the analysis with the interpreter’s text (Table 4) were that the effects for number of words 
and self-handicapping strategies were now no longer significant. 
Although the Veracity x Interpreter multivariate interaction effect was not significant, 
at a univariate level the same effect emerged as in the analysis with the interpreter’s text: A 
significant Veracity x Interpreter interaction effect for unique complications emerged, F(1, 
196) = 4.64, p = .032, ηp2 = .02. The effect followed the same pattern as for the interpreter’s 
text analysis:  For truth tellers, the interpreter-absent interviews resulted in more 
complications than the interpreter-present interviews, whereas for liars no difference between 
the two conditions emerged (Table 6).  
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Discussion 
 Interpreter effects 
 The interpreter-absent interviews resulted in more details than the interpreter-present 
interviews. This effect was not caused by interpreters’ lack of translating all details the 
interviewee reported: There was no difference in the reported details between the 
interviewee’s text and interpreter’s text, and interview-present interviews resulted in fewer 
details even when the analysis was of the interviewee’s text. This does not mean that 
interpreters translated every word the interviewee said. They did not, as evidenced by the 
interviewee’s text containing more words than the interpreter’s text. However, in terms of 
translating details -defined by us as units of information- no information was lost.  
Rather than information being lost in translation, interviewees reported fewer details 
in interpreter-present interviews than in interpreter-absent interviews. In the Introduction we 
gave two possible reasons for this: Perhaps the frequent interruptions by the interpreter when 
translating the interviewee’s recall distracted the interviewee, which subsequently impaired 
his/her memory of the event; or perhaps the interviewee decided to be more concise when the 
interpreter was present, considering the time it takes for the interpreter to translate every 
detail. Our findings do not allow us to conclude the extent to which each of these two 
explanations contributed to the effect, but we found evidence that interviewees chose to be 
more concise: In the interpreter-present condition, interviewees reported fewer events than in 
the interpreter-absent condition. This happened despite that in the interpreter-present 
condition (1) interviewees wrote down more key words to discuss in the interview and (2) 
reported to have been more motivated than in the interpreter-absent interviews. The 
instruction to write down key words was vague: Interviewees were asked to write key words 
down without being told what to do with them. This may have contributed to the finding that 
interviewees wrote down more key words in the interpreter-present condition than in the 
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
interpreter-absent condition. Perhaps they thought they were asked to write them down to 
help the interpreter.  
The finding that no information was lost in translation depends, of course, on the 
quality of the interpreters used and cannot be generalised to all interpreter-present interviews. 
However, we believe that the finding that the presence of an interpreter encourages 
interviewees to report fewer details can be generalised to other interpreter-present interviews. 
In interviews where it is important to collect as much information as possible, we thus 
recommend to use interviewers who speak the interviewee’s language rather than to use 
interpreters.  
Interpreter-present interviews resulted in fewer complications than interpreter-absent 
interviews. This was found in both the interpreter’s text and interviewee’s text, meaning that 
interviewees actually reported fewer complications in interpreter-present interviews rather 
than the interpreter failing to translate them. Perhaps, interviewees were more inclined to be 
concise in the presence of an interpreter, which resulted in reporting fewer complications, 
because the main message can typically be conveyed without mentioning complications. 
However, in previous studies using the same deception scenario as the one used in the present 
experiment, no difference in reporting complications between interpreter-absent and 
interpreter-present interviews have been found (Vrij, Leal et al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2018c). 
Instead, Vrij et al. (2018c) found that interpreter-present interviews resulted in fewer 
common knowledge details than interpreter-absent interviews, a finding not replicated in the 
current study. In other words, to date no clear pattern has emerged how the presence of an 
interpreter influences the occurrence of complications and common knowledge details. We 
believe that this issue warrants further investigation given the importance of such cues for 
verbal lie detection purposes.  
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In the current study the presence of an interpreter had an effect on self-handicapping 
strategies. This pattern differs from previous studies in which we found no effect of the 
interpreter on self-handicapping strategies (Vrij et al., 2017, 2018c). Self-handicapping 
strategies were reported less in interpreter-present interviews, which was caused by 
interpreters not translating all of them rather than interviewees generating fewer. Since a self-
handicapping strategy utterance explains why someone cannot provide certain information, 
interpreters perhaps focused on what they found more informative – the details interviewees 
did report- rather than focusing on what they found less informative: the reasons interviewees 
gave for not reporting details.  
Veracity effects 
 Truth tellers reported more total details and more complications, but fewer common 
knowledge details and fewer self-handicapping strategies than liars. As a result, the 
proportion of complications was also higher in truth tellers than in liars, and this variable 
discriminated truth tellers from liars better than total details. These findings replicate what 
has been found in previous studies (Vrij 2017, 2018a, b, c). These findings should not be 
misunderstood. We are not arguing that total details is a poor indicator of deceit. Truth tellers 
typically report more details than liars as meta-analyses revealed (Amado et al., 2016; 
DePaulo et al., 2003; Oberlader et al., 2016) and we also found this in the present experiment. 
However, we argue that the proportion of complications may be a more diagnostic cue to 
distinguish truth tellers from liars than total details. We therefore encourage researchers and 
practitioners to examine complications, common knowledge details, self-handicapping 
strategies and the proportion of complications. We realise that examining the proportion of 
complications could be challenging for practitioners, even more so when they are supposed to 
calculate this in real time during interviews. Note that just the variable complications also 
yielded strong Veracity effect, both in the current experiment and in previous experiments 
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(Vrij, Leal et al. 2017; Vrij et al., 2018a, b, c). Practitioners may decide just to focus on 
complications instead.  
Sketching effects 
 We found only one effect of sketching, a Veracity x Interpreter effect. Liars reported 
that they found sketching more difficult with than without an interpreter, whereas the 
presence of an interpreter had no effect on truth tellers. Whatever the reason for this, it did 
not affect liars’ verbal responses when sketching. In fact, we failed to find any significant 
effects for the Sketch manipulation in terms of participants’ responses. This went against our 
predictions and also contradicted previous research. In research with cooperative witnesses 
(truth tellers) it has been found that the instruction to sketch while narrating resulted in more 
information than the instruction just to talk (Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 2009; Leins, Fisher, 
Pludwinsky, Robertson, Mueller, 2014; Mattison, Dando, & Ormerod, 2015). And in the only 
other deception study including sketching while narrating to date, it was found that truth 
tellers provided more details and complications than liars, but only in the sketch while 
narrating condition (Vrij et al., 2018a). A lack of power could not have explained the absence 
of the Veracity main or Veracity x Sketch interaction effects. There were at least 68 
participants in each of the three cells that represented the Sketch factor and for the Veracity x 
Sketch interaction, there were at least 34 participants in each cell. Cell sizes of 68 and 34 are 
large enough to observe strong and medium effects respectively. G*Power a priori tests 
indicate that for MANOVA for special effects and interactions, with 3 groups, 2 predictors 
and measuring up to 6 response variables, a total sample size of 32 is required for an f2(V) = 
0.5, and 23 for f2(V) = 0.8 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).  
 We believe that the present null effects were caused by our procedural instruction that 
was unique to the present experiment.  Specifically, we asked participants to write down key 
words about what they wanted to discuss in the interview--which did not happen in previous 
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studies. We did so to examine whether the presence of an interpreter would affect how many 
key words participants would write down. We now believe that this instruction affected the 
drawing findings. Through this instruction, participants committed themselves to what to 
report prior to the Sketch manipulation and this may have overshadowed the effect of the 
Sketch manipulation itself. If our explanation is correct, then the timing and wording of the 
sketch instructions is important. When we discuss the use of sketches with practitioners they 
often tell us that they do not have a specific strategy of how and when to introduce the sketch 
request; neither do they contemplate whether this would matter. We hope that future research 
will examine the best way to introduce sketches in interview settings.  
Methodological considerations 
 In Phase 2, interviewees could have used two different strategies. They could have 
chosen to discuss a few events in more detail or more events in less detail. Our data enable us 
to distinguish between these two strategies only indirectly, by considering (1) the number of 
events discussed as an indicator of how many events an interviewee chose to discuss and (2) 
the number of key words written down as the amount of detail s/he chose to report about an 
event. No Veracity effect emerged for these two variables. For the Interpreter factor 
significant differences emerged. In the Interpreter-present condition interviewees reported 
fewer events but wrote down more key words than in the Interpreter-absent condition.  
 Although the interview consisted of two phases, we did not include Phase as a within-
factor in the design for several reasons. First, the coding in the two phases was not 
independent from each other. We examined new information reported in Phase 2 not yet 
reported in Phase 1. The amount of new information in Phase 2 depends on the amount of 
information already reported in Phase 1. That is, the more details reported about a trip in 
Phase 1, the less likely that new information can be reported in Phase 2. We therefore 
included the amount of information reported in Phase 1 as a covariate in the Phase 2 analyses. 
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
Second, the Phase factor included a confound. The difference between the two phases was 
not only the Sketching manipulation (present in Phase 2 and absent in Phase 1), but also the 
type of question asked (an open recall format in Phase 1 and a more specific questioning 
format in Phase 2). This change was necessary for the sketch manipulation. Someone can 
only make a sketch of particular moments in a trip, not of the entire trip, as that would result 
in interviewees requesting to sketch a cartoon (sequence after sequence). Third, we did not 
expect any differences between Phases 1 and 2 for the Veracity and Interpreter factors, the 
only two factors that were manipulated in both phases. In fact, we found little differences in 
the Veracity and Interpreter effects between the two phases. For Veracity, the only difference 
was that the self-handicapping strategies effects was not significant in Phase 2, event 1, a 
finding we cannot explain. For the Interpreter effects, the only differences were that the total 
details effect was not significant in Phase 2, event 1 and that the complications effect was not 
significant in Phase 2, events 2-4. Again, findings we cannot explain.  
Conclusion 
 The interpreter-absent interviews resulted in more details than the interpreter-present 
interviews, because interviewees reported fewer details in interpreter-present interviews than 
in interpreter-absent interviews. Since gathering information is a main aim in investigative 
interviews, practitioners are advised to take this negative effect into account when deciding to 
use interpreters in interviews. In terms of interviewees’ responses, the proportion of 
complications variable discriminated truth tellers from liars better than total details. This was 
the case in both interpreter-absent and interpreter-present interviews, contributing to the 
growing evidence that the proportion of complications is a diagnostic indicator of veracity.  
Unlike in previous research, drawing did not facilitate recall or lie detection, possibly due to 
the way the request to sketch was introduced in the experiment.     
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Table 1. Statistical Results as a Function of Veracity 
 Truth  Lie 
   F     p 
Cohen’s d 
M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI      d 95% CI 
Preparation thoroughness 04.67 (01.18) 04.44, 04.90  04.30 (01.17) 04.08, 04.53 05.05 .026 0.31 0.03, 0.59 
Preparation time 06.07 (01.13) 05.80, 06.34  05.35 (01.62) 05.08, 05.62 13.59 < .001 0.52 0.23, 0.79 
Percentage truth telling 94.20 (12.20) 90.17, 98.29  21.78 (26.66) 17.77, 25.84 623.02 < .001 3.49 3.00, 3.87 
Number of key words written down 04.90 (02.62) 04.37, 05.42  04.84 (02.78) 04.31, 05.35 00.03 .863 0.02 -.25, 0.30 
Number of events reported 02.44 (00.89) 02.29, 02.60  02.49 (00.77) 02.33, 02.64 00.14 .708 0.06 -.22, 0.33 
Phase 1 (N = 205)          
Number of details (total details) 39.15 (23.22) 35.89, 43.52  34.51 (15.75) 30.25, 37.85 04.13 .043 0.23 -0.05, 0.51 
Number of complications 05.50 (06.91) 04.44, 06.43  02.00 (02.35) 01.11, 03.09 21.05 < .001 0.68 0.39, 0.95 
Number of common knowledge details 03.82 (02.69) 03.30, 04.34  04.71 (02.52) 04.20,05.23 05.60 .019 0.34 0.06, 0.61 
Number of self-handicapping strategies 00.16 (00.44) 00.04, 00.27  00.35 (00.68) 00.24, 00.46 05.57 .019 0.33 0.05, 0.60 
Proportion of complications 00.47 (00.34) 00.42, 00.54  00.26 (00.27) 00.19, 00.31 26.97 < .001 0.68 0.39, 0.96 
Phase 2, event 1 (N = 205)          
Number of new details (total new details) 10.62 (08.49) 09.19, 12.00  07.54 (05.30) 06.21, 09.00 08.47 < .001 0.44 0.15, 0.58 
Number of new complications 02.37 (02.82) 01.89, 02.77  01.20 (01.47) 00.82, 01.69 11.10 < .001 0.52 0.24, 0.79 
Number of new common knowledge details 00.17 (00.47) 00.07, 00.31  00.54 (00.72) 00.40, 00.64 13.33 < .001 0.61 0.32, 0.88 
Number of new self-handicapping strategies 00.02 (00.14) -.0.04,00.08  00.09 (00.37) 00.03, 00.15 02.84  .094 0.25 -0.03, 0.52 
Proportion of complications 00.80 (00.33) 00.73, 00.87  00.58 (00.38) 00.52, 00.66 16.31 < .001 0.62 0.33, 0.89 
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Phase 2, events 2-4 (N = 184)          
Number of new details (total new details) 11.50 (10.49) 09.28, 13.01  07.45 (06.71) 05.89, 09.43 06.77 .010 0.46 0.16, 0.75 
Number of new complications 03.19 (03.49) 02.52, 03.72  01.40 (01.84) 00.88, 02.02 14.89 < .001 0.65 0.34, 0.94 
Number of new common knowledge details 00.16 (00.48) 00.01, 00.36  00.69 (01.00) 00.50, 00.83 14.86 < .001 0.67 0.36, 0.95 
Number of new self-handicapping strategies 00.01 (00.11) -0.05, 00.05  00.07 (00.30) 00.04, 00.13 05.02 .018 0.26 -.03, 0.55 
Proportion of complications 00.86 (00.27) 00.79, 00.94  00.55 (00.39) 00.48, 00.62 35.53 < .001 0.92 0.60, 1.21 
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Table 2. Statistical Results as a Function of Interpreter 
 Interpreter absent  Interpreter present 
   F     p 
Cohen’s d 
M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI      d 95% CI 
Motivation to perform well 03.86 (00.68) 03.72, 04.00  04.13 (00.72) 04.00, 04.27 07.47 .007 0.39 0.10, 0.66 
Rapport 05.36 (00.84) 05.19, 05.52  05.60 (00.85) 05.44, 05.77 04.36 .038 0.28 0.00, 0.58 
Number of key words written down 04.49 (02.18) 03.96, 05.00  05.24 (03.08) 04.73, 05.76 04.16 .043 0.28 0.00, 0.58 
Number of events reported 02.58 (00.80) 02.43, 02.75  02.35 (00.83) 02.18, 02.49 05.04 .026 0.28 0.00, 0.58 
Phase 1 (N = 205)          
Number of details (total details) 39.31 (21.34) 35.81, 43.44  34.40 (18.18) 30.47, 37.89 03.98 .047 0.25 -.03, 0.52 
Number of complications 04.58 (06.77) 03.75, 05.74  02.92 (03.55) 01.81, 03.77 07.39 .007 0.31 0.03, 0.58 
Number of common knowledge details 04.29 (02.32) 03.74, 04.78  04.25 (02.92) 03.76, 04.79 00.01 .973 0.02 -0.26, 0.29 
Number of self-handicapping strategies 00.34 (00.65) 00.22, 00.44  00.17 (00.49) 00.07, 00.29 03.55 .061 0.30 0.02, 0.57 
Proportion of complications 00.38 (00.32) 00.33,00.45  00.35 (00.33) 00.28, 00.40 01.06 .306 0.09 -0.18, 0.36 
Phase 2, event 1 (N = 205)          
Number of new details (total new details) 09.48 (07.85) 08.09, 10.90  08.68 (06.57) 07.32, 10.08 00.61 .434 0.11 -0.17, 0.38 
Number of new complications 02.19 (02.72) 01.70,02.58  01.39 (01.76) 01.01, 01.88 04.77 .030 0.35 0.07, 0.62 
Number of common knowledge details 00.34 (00.57) 00.25, 00.49  00.38 (00.70) 00.22, 00.46 00.10 .756 0.06 -.21, 0.34 
Number of self-handicapping strategies 00.08 (00.37) 00.03, 00.14  00.03 (00.17) -0.03, 00.81 01.84 .177 0.17 -.10, 0.45 
Proportion of complications 00.70 (00.38) 00.61, 00.75  00.69 (00.37) 00.64, 00.78 00.23 .633 0.03 -.25, 0.30 
Phase 2, events 2-4 (N = 184)          
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Number of new details (total new details) 10.95 (10.52) 09.40, 12.94  07.76 (06.58) 05.80, 09.46 07.25 .008 0.36 0.07, 0.65 
Number of new complications 02.43 (03.32) 01.95, 03.09  02.08 (02.37) 01.46, 02.64 01.20 .274 0.12 -.17, 0.41 
Number of new common knowledge details 00.51 (00.98) 00.34, 00.67  00.36 (00.64) 00.18, 00.51 01.70 .194 0.18 -.11, 0.47 
Number of new self-handicapping strategies 00.05 (00.27) 00.01, 00.10  00.03 (00.18) -0.02, 00.08 00.66 .417 0.09 -.20, 0.37 
Proportion of complications 00.69 (00.34) 00.63, 00.77  00.71 (00.39) 00.65, 00.79 00.19 .664 0.05 -.24, 0.34 
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Table 3. Statistical Results for the Interpreter Text and Interviewee Text comparison 
 
  
 Interpreter text  Interviewee text 
   F     p 
Cohen’s 
d 
M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI      
d 
95% 
CI 
Number of 
words 
780.93 
(420.02) 
699.25,862.62  973.55 
(589.99) 
858.81,1088.29 33.45 < 
.001 
.38 .10, 
.64 
Number of 
unique details 
(total unique 
details) 
49.80 
(20.44) 
45.82, 53.77  48.93 
(22.87) 
44.49, 53.38 00.75 .389 .04 -.23, 
.31 
Number of 
unique 
complications 
06.12 
(05.44) 
05.06, 07.17  05.61 
(06.06) 
04.43, 06.78 03.75 .056 .09 -.18, 
.36 
Number of 
unique common 
knowledge 
details 
04.83 
(03.18) 
04.21, 05.45  04.96 
(03.26) 
04.33, 05.97 00.34 .562 .04 -.23, 
.31 
Number of 
unique self-
handicapping 
strategies 
00.23 
(00.54) 
00.13, 00.34  00.35 
(00.69) 
00.21, 00.48 04.98 .028 .19 -.08, 
.46 
Proportion of 
complications 
00.49 
(00.30) 
00.43, 00.55  00.46 
(00.32) 
00.40, 00.52 06.40 .013 .10 -.18, 
.37 
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Table 4. Statistical Results for the Interpreter Absent and Interpreter Text comparison 
 Truth  Lie 
   F     p 
Cohen’s d 
M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI      d 95% CI 
Number of words 1011.62 (811.46) 855.93, 1127.16  860.88 (580.37) 752.70, 1021.66 01.12 .290 .21 -.06, .49 
Number of unique details (total unique details) 59.69 (27.85) 55.47, 64.58  49.00 (18.44) 44.20, 53.47 10.88 .001 .45 .17, .72 
Number of unique complications 10.63 (09.84) 09.14, 12.02  04.60 (03.98) 03.28, 06.15 31.05 <.001 .80 .51, 1.08 
Number of unique common knowledge details 04.08 (02.80) 03.52, 04.64  05.59 (02.82) 05.04, 6.15 13.83 < .001 .54 .25, .81 
Number of unique self-handicapping strategies 00.19 (00.48) 00.03, 00.33  00.50 (00.99) 00.36, 00.67 09.12 .003 .40 .12, .67 
Proportion of complications 00.63 (00.29) 00.58, 00.68  00.39 (00.26) 00.33, 00.44 39.23 <.001 .87 .57, 1.14 
 Interpreter absent  Interpreter text 
   F     p 
Cohen’s d 
M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI      d 95% CI 
Number of words 1095.44 (887.62) 985.60, 1256.74  780.93 (420.02) 623.49, 890.62 13.83 < .001 .46 .17, .73 
Number of unique details (total unique details) 58.97 (26.75) 55.03, 64.23  49.80 (20.44) 44.69, 53.76 09.79 .002 .39 .10, .66 
Number of unique complications 09.13 (09.87) 07.99, 10.87  06.12 (05.44) 04.44, 07.28 11.75 .001 .38 .10, .65 
Number of unique common knowledge details 04.85 (02.61) 04.27, 05.39  04.83 (03.18) 04.29, 05.39 00.01 .973 .01 -.27, .28 
Number of unique self-handicapping strategies 00.47 (00.98) 00.31, 00.62  00.23 (00.54) 00.08, 00.38 04.55 .034 .30 .02, .58 
Proportion of complications 00.52 (00.30) 00.47, 00.58  00.49 (00.30) 00.43, 00.54 01.09 .297 .10 -.18, .37 
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Table 5. Statistical Results for the Interpreter Absent and Interviewee Text comparison 
 Truth  Lie 
   F     p 
Cohen’s d 
M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI      
d 
95% 
CI 
Number of words 1127.40 (871.54) 957.75, 1248.83  940.71 (601.44) 822.76, 1112.48 01.63 .203 .03 -.24, .30 
Number of unique details (total 
unique details) 
59.22 (29.02) 55.10, 64.70  48.59 (19.73) 43.32, 52.87 11.38 .001 .43 .15, .70 
Number of unique complications 10.22 (10.36) 08.68, 11.70  04.50 (04.00) 03.09, 06.10 25.74 < .001 .73 .44, 1.00 
Number of unique common 
knowledge details 
04.17 (02.80) 03.67, 04.77  05.64 (02.93) 05.04, 06.13 11.79 .001 .51 .23, .78 
Number of unique self-
handicapping strategies 
00.25 (00.57) 00.10, 00.43  00.55 (01.03) 00.38, 00.71 05.61 .019 .36 .08, .63 
Proportion of complications 00.60 (00.30) 00.54, 00.66  00.38 (00.27) 00.32, 00.43 30.27 < .001 .77 .48, 1.04 
 Interpreter absent  Interviewee text 
   F     p 
Cohen’s d 
M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI      
d 
95% 
CI 
Number of words 1095.44 (887.62) 985.60, 1256.74  973.55 (589.99) 802.89, 1089.57 02.89 .091 .16 -.11, .43 
Number of unique details (total 
unique details) 
58.97 (26.75) 55.03, 64.23  48.93 (22.87) 43.71, 53.16 10.33 .002 .40 .12, .67 
Number of unique complications 09.13 (09.87) 07.99, 10.87  05.61 (06.06) 03.90, 06.88 04.64 .032 .43 .15, .70 
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Number of unique common 
knowledge details 
04.85 (02.61) 04.27, 05.39  04.96 (03.26) 04.47, 05.55 00.01 .948 .04 -.24, .31 
Number of unique self-
handicapping strategies 
00.47 (00.98) 00.31, 00.62  00.35 (00.69) 00.19, 00.52 01.86 .174 .14 -.13, .41 
Proportion of complications 00.52 (00.30) 00.47, 00.58  00.46 (00.32) 00.39, 00.50 00.01 .973 .19 -.08, .46 
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
Table 6. Statistical Results for the Veracity x  Interpreter Interaction 
 Interpreter absent  Interpreter text 
   F     p 
Cohen’s d  
M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI      d 95% CI  
Number of unique complications: Truth tellers 13.24 (12.10) 10.88, 16.33  08.12 (06.15) 05.09, 10.44 08.98  .003 .54 .13, .92 5.17 
Number of unique complications: Liars 05.10 (04.22) 04.14, 06.41  04.12 (03.70) 02.86, 05.08 02.46  .120 .25 -.14, .63 0.42 
 Interpreter absent  Interviewee text      
 M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI F p d 95% CI  
Number of unique complications: Truth tellers 13.24 (12.10) 10.88, 16.33  07.31 (07.38) 04.26, 09.89 09.73 .002 .59 .19, .98 16.81 
Number of unique complications: Liars 05.10 (04.22) 04.14, 06.41  03.90 (03.72) 02.61, 04.86 03.49 .065 .30 -.09, .69 0.58 
